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Artiklens sigte er at underkaste Chomskys nyskabende 
nominale sammensætning – “the mind/brain” – en 
nøjere undersøgelse. Hovedargumentet er at den skaber 
en glidebane, således at det der burde være en 
funktionel diskussion – hvad er det hjernen gør når den 
behandler sprog? – i stedet bliver en systemdiskussion – 
hvad er den interne struktur af den menneskelige 
sprogevne? Argumentet søges ført igennem under 
streng iagttagelse af de kognitive videnskabers opfattelse 
af information og repræsentation, specielt som forstået 
af den amerikanske filosof Frederick I. Dretske. 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Cartesian dualism is dead, but the central problems it was supposed to solve 
persist: What kinds of substances exist? Are bodily things (only) physical, mental 
‘things’ (only) metaphysical? How is the mental related to the physical? 
Although “we are all materialists now”, such questions still need answers, and 
they still need answers from within realist and naturalist bounds to count as 
scientific. 
Linguistics is a discipline that may be expected to contribute with answers to 
such questions. No one in their right mind would deny that our ability to 
acquire and use human language is lodged between our ears – inside our heads. 
That is, in our brains and/or minds. In some quarters it has been customary for 
the past 50 odd years or so to regard this ability as a distinct and dedicated 
cognitive ability on a par with our abilities to see (vision) or to keep our balance 
(equilibrioception), and to refer to it as the Human Language Faculty (HLF). This 
has been the axiomatic starting point for the development of main stream 
generative linguistics as founded by Chomsky in 1955 in what I shall refer to as 
‘Chomsky’s programme’. 
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In that programme, HLF is assumed to be neutral with respect to production and 
reception of utterances, on the grounds that it would be ‘unnatural’ to assume 
that we were endowed with two radically distinct faculties, one for production 
and one for reception and understanding. This may appear to be a reasonable 
view, but the fact remains that production and reception are radically distinct 
processes. It is therefore only a reasonable view at a level of abstraction at which 
HLF is regarded as an insulated system, closed off relative to other cognitive 
systems, a system that can be shown to be relevantly engaged in both 
production and reception, but which at the same time can be shown to remain 
immune from those factors that make production and reception different 
processes, a sort of “brain in a vat”. 
This view is a priori. Rejecting it, or rather suspending judgement on it to be 
confirmed or falsified by empirical evidence, this paper will discuss some of the 
key issues in Chomsky’s programme with a view to determining whether it is 
equipped to answer what I take to be a more legitimate a priori question: How 
can we explain the manifest human ability to understand linguistic utterances as 
vehicles for the expression of thoughts and ideas? 
The next section will present a number of “leading ideas” underlying Chomsky’s 
programme. The following main sections will then deal with these under the 
following rubrics: Representational Theories of Mind, Representational Systems, 
Representational Architectures, and The Language Faculty in Brain Studies. A 
Conclusion will sum up the main argument. 
2. THREE LEVELS OF CHOMSKYAN LINGUISTICS 
Chomsky has coined the nominal compound “mind/brain” as his contribution 
to the solution of the dualist dilemma. He has consistently argued that 
linguistics is a subbranch of biology, and that the study of HLF should be 
pursued on methodologically naturalist grounds – that is, that we stand the best 
chance of understanding the world, including such immaterial things as 
consciousness and intentionality, by pursuing them by the methods of the 
natural sciences. He has also consistently maintained that the programme he has 
been endorsing from the mid-1950’s until today is the same project, even in the 
face of a number of obvious changes in its technical details. 
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Chomsky often launches major revisions of those details by pointing to a 
significant distinction, or asking a small number of questions, pursuit of which 
will lead to corrections, big or small, of the course as charted until then. 
Government and Binding (GB) (Chomsky 1981) was launched from the distinction 
made in (I): 
(I) 1. What are the “leading ideas” of linguistics (as propounded in 
 work culminating in Chomsky 1978)? 
 2. How are these “leading ideas” best executed? 
 
GB, roughly, was seen as a revision in execution, rather than of ideas. Chomsky 
(1986), in the first major break with the leading idea of ‘rule following’, asked 
the famous three questions in (II): 
(II) 1. What constitutes knowledge of a language? 
2. How is knowledge of language acquired? 
3. How is knowledge of language put to use? 
 
The interesting one, according to Chomsky, was (II, 1), and it can only be 
answered via answers to (II, 2). The last question, (II, 3) has never been at the 
forefront of Chomsky’s own research (though cf. Chomsky 2000), generally on 
the grounds that it is too “diffuse” to merit serious attention in empirical 
research. 
The Minimalist Program (MP) (Chomsky 1995b) corrected the course by posing 
the two questions in (III). The first of these had subquestions, one asking about 
the place of the language faculty among other cognitive systems, the second 
about ‘conceptual naturalness’. 
(III) 1. What are the general conditions that the human language 
 faculty should be expected to satisfy? 
 2. To what extent is the language faculty determined by these 
 conditions, without special structures that lie beyond them? 
 
MP may be seen as a sweeping blow with Occam’s razor in that it seeks to 
dispense with principles and conditions that cannot be motivated by “virtual 
conceptual necessity”, a phrase that has engendered not a little controversy 
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(Postal 2003). It has also turned out to be a somewhat empty blow in that MP to 
a large extent still avails itself of much of the technical apparatus across which 
the principles and conditions it seeks to eliminate were first defined. I give an 
example below. 
Each set of distinctions and questions has triggered worldwide research 
programmes in a number of disciplines. The latest indication of a slight change 
of course (Chomsky 2004: 104-105) is the single question in (IV, 4) “asking not 
only what the properties of language are, but why they are that way”, after first 
specifying the properties of attained language states (I-languages) as the result of 
the three factors in (IV, 1-3). “S0” is the initial state of the language faculty, 
“PLD” is the primary linguistic data to which children are exposed and which 
thus triggers the language faculty to develop into individually attained states. 
(IV) 1. Individual experience (PLD), which selects among the options 
 allowed by S0. 
 2. S0 itself, a product of evolution. 
 3. General properties of organic systems. 
 4. Why is the language faculty the way it is? 
 
This last question goes “beyond explanatory adequacy”. At least it goes beyond 
the stage at which it is still legitimate to ask what the language faculty is like. It 
presumes that we now know this. It is thus pointing towards new directions, 
revitalizing biolinguistic and neurolinguistic programmes. 
These four changes home in on three general ‘levels’ within the overall theory, 
which might be formulated as a further triplet of questions: 
(2) a. From (I): What are the technical details needed to formalize the 
  “leading ideas”? 
 b. From (II): How are the “leading ideas” expressed as properties of 
  the mind/brain? 
 c. From (III, IV): What kind of constraints regulate the expression of the 
  “leading ideas” as properties of the mind/brain? 
 
The “leading ideas” are taken as constants, except for the shift from ‘rule 
following’ to statements of principles and conditions. This particular change, I 
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think, was enforced by a general concern for ‘psychological reality’. No lasting 
success had come from psycholinguistic experiments in the 1960’s and 1970’s to 
support theses about processing time as a relevant parameter in the account of 
transformations, for example (Townsend & Bever 2001: 26ff), and the whole 
idea of ‘trees in the head’, to say the least, seemed counterintuitive. Modern 
methods of brain scanning put more stock on amounts and areas of neuronal 
activation. 
From among a longer list of “leading ideas”, I shall be concerned here with the 
following four, with special focus on the italicized parts: 
(3) a. The human language faculty is an innate, species-specific, 
 autonomous component of the “mind/brain”. 
 b. Its central component is a computational mechanism, an I-language, 
 which generates representations on the basis of information. 
 c. Its function is to pair representations of sound with representations of 
 meaning. 
 d. Representations are states of the “mind/brain” at a subconscious (or 
 perhaps ‘infraconscious’) level of awareness. 
 
As is evident from (2), the development of the overall theory has progressed 
from investigation of technical questions of language structure, through 
considerations of how these technical matters may be expressed in human 
cognition, to questions of how to constrain such expressions in biological terms. 
Answers to questions of a technical nature have been taken to supply, or sustain, 
answers to question (2, b). The result has been an impressive accumulation of 
detailed knowledge of the structural properties of particular languages, on the 
understanding that many of these are predicted as specific instantiations of 
properties of universal grammar (UG), the initial state, S0, of (IV, 2). With the 
advent of (2, c), many of these results have been revised, even – at least 
rhetorically – rejected. To claim that “government”, for example, no longer plays 
a role as a structural principle does not carry much weight when the machinery 
over which government was first defined as a structurally significant principle, is 
retained in the form of a version of X-bar theory (Chomsky 1995b: 173). Of 
course, as also stated, (head) government is still there, as a consequence of the 
properties of the notational scheme used to represent language structure, but it 
needs to be reformulated in terms of “local relations”. What the claim amounts 
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to, then, is a prediction that government plays no role in the cognitive or 
biological expressions of the grammar. 
I will not be talking much about the technical aspects (2, a). They have 
undergone so many changes over time that it is difficult to pin down what 
‘Chomsky’s programme’ is in technical terms. Culicover and Jackendoff (2005: 
Chs. 2-3) make a bold attempt to keep track of it through time. Nor would it be 
reasonable to regard these various technical versions as just Chomsky’s, for 
many of the details are due to proposals made by other investigators working 
within the mainstream. I regard these various versions as so many ‘surface 
structures’, different material realizations of the same “leading ideas”, which 
under this view may be regarded as providing an ‘underlying structure’ of 
assumptions. These, Chomsky often says, haven’t changed since 1955. It is this 
structure of assumptions converging on (2, b, c) I have in mind when I talk 
about ‘Chomsky’s programme’, and it is the role they play in the pursuit of his 
goal of explaining the human language faculty that I query. This leads to the 
somewhat paradoxical situation of defending Chomsky against attacks on 
generativism on the one hand, and criticizing him for the way he pursues it on 
the other.  
My aim is emphatically not to reject Chomsky’s goal or generativism in general. 
On the contrary. It is an important goal to pursue, and generativism, it seems to 
me, is the only way to pursue it. But I happen to believe that it cannot be 
reached by revising or changing the technical machinery dealt with under 
question (2, a), or by adding to what I above called the ‘surface structures’ of the 
theory. My main criticism is directed at the conclusions drawn from technical 
matters to the nature of the underlying structure of assumptions and, in 
particular, the bounds of idealization that Chomsky sets up, in my view too 
narrowly to further his cause, and the investigative consequences he draws 
within these bounds with respect to the notions of information and representation. 
The main inspiration for this project has been the writings of Frederick I. 
Dretske, an American philosopher whose work in epistemology is firmly 
grounded precisely in these two notions. 
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3. REPRESENTATIONAL THEORIES OF MIND 
How the brain is composed and how it works is reasonably well understood and I 
won’t go into that here (see e.g. Feldman 2008: Part II). The mind is rather more 
mysterious. 
3.1. Mind Models 
Relevant discussion has been conducted from within a body of ideas known as 
“The Computational Theory of Mind” (CTM), whose central theses are that the 
mind is a computational device, embodied in the neuronal network of the brain, 
which generates symbolic representations in the form of syntactic objects, and 
that thinking is a matter of formally manipulating these objects. 
CTM presupposes another set of ideas known as “The Representational Theory of 
Mind” (RTM), which holds that intentional states like believing, hoping, and 
wishing are in fact relations between someone who believes, hopes, or wishes 
something and mental representations with a particular semantic content 
characterizing those states. However, this has not been so much of an issue in 
generative linguistics proper as in the psycholinguistic programmes inspired by 
it, like, most famously, Jerry Fodor’s (1975) theory of a Language of Thought. In 
generative linguistics proper, the function of HLF is just to generate syntactic 
objects through a sequence of processes comprehensively known as a derivation. 
It is, nevertheless, an important point, and I return to it in more detail below. 
Taking both CTM and RTM into consideration, HLF as a mental phenomenon is 
supposed to be embodied in the brain as a computational device, and its 
function is to generate mental representations which can be semantically 
interpreted on the basis of informational input through derivation. 
3.2. Organization of Computational Models 
As a computational device, HLF is assumed to be amenable to the three levels of 
description and explanation that David Marr (1982: 25) formulated for such 
systems: 
• A level of computational theory, which specifies what the goal of the 
computation is, why it is appropriate, and what the logic of the strategy is 
by which it can be carried out. 
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• A level of representation and algorithms, which specifies how this 
computation can be implemented; in particular, what the representation 
for the input and output is, and what the algorithm for the 
transformation is. 
• A level of physical implementation, which specifies how the representation 
and algorithm can be implemented. 
 
I have argued (Thrane 1992a, b) that a fourth level is needed when the 
information that the system operates on stems from linguistic signals – cf. also 
Peacocke (1986), who dubs it “the 1½-level”: 
• A level of information, which specifies the nature of the information 
required by the computation, and how the required information is made 
available to it. 
 
3.3. Meaning and Information as Semantic and Informational Content 
Once the issue of information is brought to the forefront, it soon becomes clear 
that discrimination must be made between information understood as a physical 
epiphenomenon, and information understood in semantic terms, as roughly 
equivalent to meaning, even though this distinction is not always made: 
“meaning is information (more or less)” (Fodor 1998: 12 – cf. Floridi 2005 for 
thorough discussion of this large issue). 
This lack of discrimination is due to apparently perceived problems surrounding 
the nature of the representations that HLF is supposed to generate. Although the 
verb ‘represent’ is truly transitive, the derived nominal need not be. Something 
may be a representation pure and simple, not a representation of something, or 
to somebody. One definition of ‘representation’ states: 
On this [computational] view [of cognition], a 
representation is any internal state that mediates or plays a 
mediating role between a system’s inputs and outputs in 
virtue of that state’s semantic content. We define semantic 
content in terms of information causally responsible for the 
state, and in terms of the use to which such information is 
put. Hence, any state that mediates between the input to an 
agent and the actions performed by the agent is a 
representation (Dietrich & Markman 2003: 97). 
 
This definition highlights two troublesome points about representation – the 
claim, first, that representations (mental states) have semantic content, and the 
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claim, secondly, that whatever semantic content a representation has is causally 
responsible for behavioural output. 
In defence of the first claim, Dietrich & Markman appeal to Dretske, who 
carefully distinguishes between the informational and the semantic content of 
signals, but it will take me too far afield to unravel this distinction in detail here 
(cf. Dretske 1981: Chs. 3 and 7 for discussion). For my purpose it suffices to say 
that the informational content of a signal is the total amount of information it 
carries about a given state of affairs, whereas the semantic content of a signal is 
that piece of information which the receiver extracts as the most specific piece of 
information carried by it. To give a brief example, one observer of a particular 
object, x, may extract the information from a visual signal that x is a car; 
whereas another observer may extract – from the ‘same’ signal – the information 
that x is a Lamborghini Diablo SE 30. The information that x is a car is said to be 
nested in the information that x is a Lamborghini Diablo SE 30. Hence, the 
semantic content of a signal is whatever information the receiver extracts as its 
outermost informational shell. 
The second point concerns the intentionality of states at Marr’s three levels of 
explanation listed above. Lurking behind it is the ghost of the second, necessary, 
argument of the verb ‘represent’, which – or so the argument apparently goes – 
must at least haunt the derived nominal. A representation must be about 
something to be a representation, and it must be what the representation is 
about – its reputed semantic content – that must be the cause of behavioural 
output. 
3.4. The Nature of Representation 
In an exposition of Marr’s theory of vision, Egan (1995 – further developed in 
Egan 2003) provides a persuasive explanation why this need not be the case. If a 
representation is a mapping between structures A and B, the formal means of 
creating B at each level of representation are entirely independent of the formal 
properties of A. Not until a function is appointed by which elements of B are 
interpreted as related to elements of A does intentionality arise, and it does so 
under the presumption that the representation is generated under normal 
conditions imposed by natural constraints. Now, this may still sound as if B is 
‘about’ A – having been caused by it, or at least being causally dependent on it. 
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Indeed. But the point is that B does not ‘know’ this. It is not B that is 
intentional. Only an external – external to B – interpreter knows it. An external 
interpreter assigns intentionality to B. The system, in generating B, does 
whatever it is its job to do, even in circumstances where it would not be 
reasonable to do so, and even when doing so leads to misrepresentation. To 
exemplify, Egan (1995: 196, note 17) gives the following scenario; Dretske 
(1986) is a lengthier discussion of the same point. 
Suppose that, as part of a military training exercise, Bill, a 
normal human with a Marrian visual system, is placed in a 
room where the continuity constraint, which holds that 
disparity varies smoothly because matter is cohesive, is not 
satisfied. Bill’s visual system normally computes depth from 
disparity information. However, in these circumstances, 
where spikes of matter project in all directions, Bill (or, more 
specifically, the stereopsis module of Bill’s visual system) 
will compute the same formally characterized function as he 
normally does, but he will misrepresent some other property 
(not a property for which we have a convenient name) as 
depth. In general, where the constraints that normally 
enable an organism to compute a cognitive function are not 
satisfied, it will fail to represent its environment. 
 
The system works impeccably, the representation it generates is the 
representation it is supposed to generate, and the interpretation of it (by Bill) is 
the one he usually performs – only in this case, the information on the basis of 
which the computation was made, does not arise under normal conditions 
imposed by natural constraints. So, the signal misrepresents ‘something’ as 
depth. 
Even though the technical sense in which the cognitive sciences understand 
representation is simply that it is a state of an information-processing system, 
without prejudice of either correspondence or interpretation, the system must be 
receptive to different types of information – something it will ‘recognize’ as 
relevant information – depending on the representational state it is in at that 
particular step in the overall process. Clearly, this information must be 
organized in a way which makes it explicit to the processor, and conditions, 
furthermore, have to be ‘normal’. Our auditory system works poorly under 
water. 
In a discussion of these matters, Chomsky (1995a: 52) comments on a number 
of points made by Shimon Ullman, David Marr’s colleague and collaborator. 
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His studies of determination of structure from motion used 
tachistoscopic presentations that caused the subject to see a 
rotating cube, though there was no such thing in the 
environment; “see”, here, is used in its normal sense, not as 
an achievement verb. If Ullman could have stimulated the 
retina directly, he would have done that; or the optic nerve. 
The investigation, Ullman writes, “concerns the nature of 
the internal representations used by the visual and the 
processes by which they are derived” [reference to S. 
Ullman, The Interpretation of Visual Motion, Cambridge, 
Mass.: MIT Press, 1979, p. 3]. The account is completely 
internalist. 
 
Quite so, but there is equivocation here. Some form of excitation (of retina, or 
optic nerve) is necessary for further representations to be generated and for 
relevant processes to run. It is no doubt true to say that the representations 
generated by tachistoscopic presentations in this way are not ‘about’ cubes – but 
it was nevertheless representations of ‘nothing’ as cubes. To the subjects in the 
experiment, they were cubes, just as tinnitus ‘sound’ is sound. What the subjects 
responded to was the semantic content of the representations – that they were 
‘cubes’ – not the informational content of the representations generated by the 
more “proximal” patterns of activation on the retina, in Dretske’s (1981: 183) 
terms. 
The necessary excitatory agent in this account is information, in particular 
information carried by linguistic utterances. By Chomsky’s token, this does not 
mean that whatever representations such information causes, necessarily are 
‘about’ anything in externalist terms. Even though this is true, however, such 
representations must be as if something, just like Ullman’s cubes. Even though 
linguistic utterances may be about cubes (or mermaids, or whatever) without 
there being any cubes (mermaids) for them to externally ‘represent’, the 
information they carry must nevertheless internally represent ‘nothing’ as cubes 
(mermaids) for the utterance to be about cubes (mermaids). 
3.5. The Generation vs. Application of Representations 
Egan (2003: 97), though in essential agreement with Chomsky, frames the same 
issue in a discussion of Marr’s computational levels: 
From the fact that a computational theory is an account of 
the processes by which certain internal structures are 
derived, and from the fact that representational [i.e., 
semantic, in Dretske’s terms – TT] content plays no 
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individuative role within a computational theory, it does 
not follow that representational content plays no 
explanatory role within the theory. It is legitimate to ask 
which internal structures a computational vision theory, in 
particular, is concerned to describe and what constructing 
these structures does for the organism. These questions 
cannot be answered by appeal to purely syntactic or formal 
notions. 
 
While not agreeing that representational (semantic) content plays no 
individuative role in a computational theory – a position she herself modifies 
somewhat (2003: 98f) – I take Egan’s points about vision to carry over to matters 
linguistic, as will be made clear by (6b) below. Her subsequent suggestion that a 
distinction can be drawn between the mathematical and the cognitive functions 
that a particular mechanism is designed to compute, makes it legitimate to insist 
that information about the environment is what matters cognitively to the 
organism, and that the ways in which the mechanism provides the organism 
with information are in need of explanation. The fact that the system on 
occasion tricks its possessor into believing that something is there when it is not, 
does not alter this. That is the price the possessor pays for having it in the first 
place. 
One step towards an explanation is by drawing a distinction between the 
generation of representations on the one hand, and the application of them on 
the other. As Dretske (1981: 197) puts it, a belief is “a kind of map by which we 
steer”. The semantic content extracted is the map, the control it has over 
behaviour when applied is the steering. It is of prime importance for the 
representational account of language because it circumvents the question of 
causal dependency of representation on represented. It is, in fact, what is behind 
Barwise and Perry’s (1983: 32) notion of “efficiency of language”, the fact that 
the same expressions may be ‘recycled’ in a variety of situational contexts to say 
different things. Application of these ideas to the study of language presupposes 
that HLF is in fact a representational system. The next section explains what that 
is. 
4. REPRESENTATIONAL SYSTEMS1 
Dretske’s credo is this: “In the beginning there was information. The word came 
later” (Dretske 1981:  vii). It is a good credo. Among its many virtues is one to 
the effect that information is universal and omnipresent. It is there, whether or 
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not someone or something responds to it or is affected by it. It cannot help 
being there. But it only becomes interesting when someone or something 
responds to it or is affected by it. In other words, when some system uses it for 
something. Systems that can do that are Representational Systems. 
A Representational System (RS) =Definition Any system which – 
by design or evolution – has as its dedicated function to carry 
information about something distinct from itself. 
 
This definition explicitly mentions three characteristics of a RS – its origin, 
purpose, and direction – the latter two of which I shall comment on directly. 
The first – by design or evolution – need not detain us. I’ll simply stipulate that 
HLF is the product of evolution, on a par with other cognitive systems. For a 
comprehensive presentation and discussion of various types of RSs, the reader is 
referred to Dretske’s works listed in Footnote 1. 
4.1. DEFINING CHARACTERISTICS OF REPRESENTATIONAL SYSTEMS 
It is the function of a RS to carry information about something distinct from 
itself. A RS performs this function by entering a number of representational 
states, the relative sequentiality of which is determined by the chain of control 
(Beniger 1986). Although we can think of each state as a representation, there is 
a particular output from the system that counts as the representation for its user, 
in the form of the semantic content of the signal. How the output is reached is 
opaque, or, differently formulated, the informational content of the various states 
the system has been in during the generation, is generally unavailable to the 
user. These are states to whose informational content the user normally has no 
conscious access, or may not even be “attuned”, in Barwise & Perry’s terms. 
Searle (1992: 52) argues that functionality is a normative concept. So it is, at 
least for the functionality of designed RSs. The claim that the function of maps 
is to carry information about locations is a normative claim. Maps can be used 
for many other things as well. Yet carrying information about locations is the 
dedicated function of maps – their raison d’être. When the normatively dedicated 
function of a designed system is to carry information about something distinct 
from itself, it is a RS. 
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It is less clearly a normative claim that the function of visual systems is to enable 
the organism that has them to get visual information from its surroundings. As 
Marr formulates it, “the true heart of visual perception is the inference from the 
structure of an image about the structure of the real world outside” (Marr 1982: 68 – 
italics added).2 When the evolutionarily dedicated function of a system is to 
provide information about something distinct from itself, it is a RS. 
Dedicated functionality is a key notion in representation theory as here 
understood. It is the feature that determines whether a system is a RS or not. 
Many things carry information about something distinct from themselves. Cars, 
food, clothes may all carry information about particular lifestyles, for example, 
may even be thought to be signs for, or of, particular lifestyles, but they are not 
representational systems. It is not their dedicated function to represent 
anything, neither by evolution nor design. The criterion of dedicated 
functionality is what demarcates language from many other phenomena 
subsumed under sign systems by semiotics. 
Observance of dedicated functionality likewise dissolves what Fodor (1990: 35) 
calls the problem of “nonsymmetry of representation”. We may learn something 
about the weather by looking at a barometer – but we may also learn something 
about a barometer by looking at the weather. If it is a stormy day, we will know 
that the barometer is low, and yet the weather does not represent the barometer. 
Indeed not – it is not the dedicated function of weather to represent anything. 
The weather is not a representational system. 
The third property of RSs – carrying information about something distinct from 
itself – is of particular importance to the thesis defended here, so much so that I 
feel inclined to invent a name for it, The Principle of Functional Displacement. Any 
external RS – as a physical phenomenon3 – carries information about itself. A map 
carries information about itself in terms of different colourings, types of medium 
(paper, cardboard, whatever), size, shape, etc. But it is not the kind of 
information that is of interest here, for it is not the kind of information that 
maps are functionally designed to carry. The information carried by maps that 
interests us in the normal course of events – that is, when we are not collectors 
of maps, but users of maps – is the information they carry about locations. 
THE LANGUAGE FACULTY – MIND OR BRAIN? 
 15
In order to be able to respond in an informed manner to this sort of information 
we must know the key for interpreting the code in terms of which the system’s 
expressive elements, the notational scheme on which they rely, perform their 
representational functions. We have to know that patches of blue on a map 
carry information about the location of water, that little crosses in green areas 
carry information about marshland, that yellow lines carry information about 
secondary roads, and so on. There is usually a key for the extraction of the 
semantic content these elements are supposed to have in a corner of the map – a 
key for interpretation. Although widely, even partly internationally, 
conventionalized, these elements may in themselves be subject to variation from 
one map to the next – different shades of blue and green, different density of 
crosses, different degrees of thickness of yellow lines. This does not affect their 
representational function, however, which remains constant across maps. It only 
affects the information carried by variations in the notational scheme. 
The Principle of Functional Displacement claims that the same holds for internal 
representation systems, like HLF. This has wide ramifications for linguistic 
theory. It is readily agreed by proponents of most versions of generative theory 
that HLF generates representations. It is less readily agreed that the 
representations thus generated ultimately must be such that the information 
they carry is about situational structure and not about the structure of language 
itself. This is where representational theories differ most radically from 
derivational ones. While derivational theories assume that the generation of a 
sequence of representational states (Deep Structure, Surface Structure; S-
structure, D-structure, Logical Form, Phonological Form, etc., depending on 
version – see further section 5.1.1.), amounts to a restructuring of the previous 
one (viz. a derivation), representational theories regard each representational 
state as a product of the information generated at the previous one. The next 
section expands on the consequences of this difference. 
4.2. The Derivational-Representational Opposition 
There is some uncertainty over the consequences of choosing a derivational in 
favour of a representational approach to syntax within mainstream 
generativism, as expressed, for example, by Lasnik (2001). Sometimes it is 
implied that the two approaches are (terminological) variants of the same 
underlying reality (e.g. Chomsky 1995b: 150f), even to the point where it might 
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be a matter of personal preference which option to adopt. Championing a 
representational over a derivational approach to syntactic theory, Michael Brody 
argues that there are both empirical and theoretical reasons why the two 
approaches cannot just be (preferential or terminological) variants. He 
establishes the following three-way distinction: 
(4) i A derivational theory is nonrepresentational if the 
 derivational operations create opaque objects 
 whose internal elements and composition is (sic) 
 not accessible to any further rule or operation. 
 ii A derivational theory is weakly representational if 
 derivational stages are transparent (i.e. 
 representations), in the sense that material already 
 assembled can be accessed by later principles. 
 iii A derivational theory is strongly representational if 
 it is weakly representational and there are 
 constraints on the representations (weak sense) 
 generated (Brody 2002: 22-3). 
 
He claims that extant derivational theories are not purely derivational, but at 
least weakly representational in these terms.4 He continues: 
The real difference between derivational and 
representational approaches is different. The 
representational theory is a single level theory, all 
representations/derivations except the ‘final’ representation, 
LF, are eliminated – so conditions can only hold here. This 
is clearly one obvious way to constrain the 
multirepresentational theory: assume the existence of only a 
single representation, the one corresponding to the final 
output of the derivational system. Henceforth, I refer by 
representational theory unambiguously to the single level 
representational approach. To emphasize the 
representational properties of derivational theories I shall 
use the term “multi-representational”. 
The derivational approach constrains the multi-
representational theory differently, in a way that does not 
resolve the problems of the mixed theory. The derivational 
representational duplication now translates as the duplication 
between the final representation and the relevant aspects of all 
representations generated that carry the same information. 
Sisterhood and projection is duplicated at multiple levels by 
the effects of merge and chain by those of move [Footnote 
omitted]. The derivational theory ignores the problems of 
duplication and lack of restrictiveness, but suggests a 
different restriction. In this approach constraints like merge 
and move (which, as we have seen, are effectively equivalent 
to multilevel representational constraints) are individuated 
and are crucially required to operate in a sequential manner 
(Brody 2002: 25, italics added). 
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The section I have italicized makes the point I want to emphasize, that syntactic 
representations in a derivational framework carry information about the system, 
hence just ‘duplicates’ itself. The point Brody is making, that a reduction of a 
“multi-representational” to a “single level representational” approach with the 
single level identified as LF, does not solve the duplication problem on its own, 
however, unless it is supplemented by a demand that the information this level 
is supposed to carry, is information about something distinct from the system 
that generated it. Even within Brody’s framework of “Elegant Syntax”, the single 
representational level envisaged does not do this. It is still a representational 
level at which systemic information is recorded. 
The matter of numbers of levels of representations is not an issue. What is 
decisive is that a given representation, Rn, is – not a representation of Rn-1 at level 
Ln – but a representation generated by the information carried by Rn-1 at Ln. Such 
representations, to be sure, are linguistic in some sense, but they are not 
representations of something as language structure. They are representations with 
a particular semantic content and – hence – representations of language structure 
as particular semantic types. It will take me too far afield to comment further on 
this particular issue here. Cf. Thrane (2004a, b, 2008) for further discussion. 
Instead I’ll briefly present and comment on the thesis behind the 
representational approach to the study of HLF. 
4.3. The Extended Representational Thesis 
The thesis that Dretske introduces under the label The Representational Thesis in 
the Prologue to his (1995: xiii), from which the in-text quotations in the 
following section derive as well, comprises the two clauses (5b, c), to which I 
have added a third, (5a): 
(5) a. All linguistic facts are mental facts. 
 b. All mental facts are representational facts. 
 c. All representational facts are facts about informational functions. 
 
Dretske’s thesis is claimed to amount to a representationally naturalistic theory of 
mind – and in particular to provide an inroad to the study of consciousness 
through “the baffling problems of phenomenal experience”. It does not, as he 
admits, remove all obstacles to an understanding of phenomenal experience, or, 
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indeed, to consciousness, but enough of them to be worth exploring. Whatever 
benefits such an approach may turn out to have, he says, “derive from 
conceiving of the mind as the representational face of the brain”, Dretske’s 
much more poignant version of Chomsky’s “mind/brain” compound. 
The motivation behind the thesis is the claim that not much insight into 
intentional phenomena is likely to accrue from more and more detailed study of 
the systemic properties of bearers of intentionality. For that, an account is 
needed of what these bearers do – in other words, a functional account. He draws 
an analogy to a camera. If you don’t know what a camera is, to be told about f-
stops, focal lengths, and shutter speeds won’t help you understand it. You need 
to be told what cameras do. This is perhaps the single most decisive 
pronouncement that has motivated the present study. In order to make it clear 
why, I will elaborate on it. 
First of all, Dretske’s plea for functionality is not a plea for the kind of 
functionality associated with the ideas behind functional linguistics. Dretske is 
not, of course, saying, nor implying, that cameras are the way they are because 
they may be used to take pictures, or, even worse, that they are the way they are 
because they may be used to take pictures of people, or landscapes, or sports 
events, or whatever. He is just saying that in order to understand what a camera 
is, you need to know what its normatively dedicated function is, what it does 
whenever it performs, or in order to perform, whatever particular task it is called 
upon to perform within its dedicated functionality. So far, so good. 
There is, however, another kind of functionality at play which Dretske does not 
explicitly consider, but which is important here. Cameras (old fashioned, 
analogue ones at least) have various knobs, levers and dials by which to calibrate 
for shutter aperture and speed, and for getting things in focus. Each of these 
performs a system-internal function, and they are entirely non-representational. 
You calibrate for focus by turning a dial, you regulate the speed of the shutter by 
moving a lever, you enlarge the shutter aperture (f-stop) by twisting a knob, all 
depending on the make of camera. Precisely how these various gadgets are 
designed to allow the shutter and the lens to perform their dedicated functions is 
immaterial. What matters, again, is the function. However, an account of these 
functions enters into the overall account of the systemic side. Facts about them, 
THE LANGUAGE FACULTY – MIND OR BRAIN? 
 19
again, are not representational facts, but facts about a representational system. 
Being told in detail about these functions will no more make you understand 
what a camera is than being told how they are implemented. It is the system-
external functionality Dretske is after, the functionality of the camera as a whole, 
relative to input (light) and output (photo). This distinction is important if we 
want to extend it, metaphorically speaking, to the field of Generative Grammar 
and especially to the notion of representational system that it adopts. 
5. REPRESENTATIONAL ARCHITECTURES 
This section will discuss various proposals for the internal organization, or 
‘architecture’, of the system that is engaged in the processing of linguistically 
borne information. By using the singular ‘system’, I initially want to remain 
neutral with respect to the possibility that several distinct systems may be 
distinguished and justified. In particular, I want to remain neutral with respect 
to the question of where, and on what grounds, to draw the boundary between 
HLF and “other systems of mind” assumed to be relevant to language acquisition 
and use, so prominent in the branches of linguistic theory dominated by 
Chomsky. In the literature these topics are generally discussed in terms of the 
notion of “representational level”. I’ll avail myself of the vertical dimensionality 
implied by ‘level’ for discursive and illustrative purposes. I do not thereby 
suggest that the language system, or any other representational system, is 
shaped like a wedding cake. 
The general idea that a representational system is internally organized in terms 
of levels may be illustrated from David Marr’s study of vision. Four distinct, 
major levels of representation are recognized: the Retinal Image, the Primal 
Sketch, the 2½-D Sketch, and the 3D-model, though it was not concluded that 
there might not be others (e.g. Marr 1982: 275), as indicated in Figure 1. But 
these are the major ones, each with a distinct representational function, 
providing the next level ‘up’ with information in a suitable format for further 
processing. Likewise, for each level, algorithms are specified that will compute 




Figure 1. Representational Levels in Vision according to Marr 
Two conditions determine the postulation of a particular representational level. 
As Chomsky points out (1986: 157) “the choice of levels of representation and 
their properties is an empirical matter, to be verified by their role in 
explanation”. Representational levels are not ‘given’, it has to be shown how 
they are to be identified, and it must be shown how postulation of them will 
contribute to the overall explanation of the phenomenon under investigation. 
This presupposes that it is made clear what the overall representational process is 
taken to lead to. 
(6) a. Condition on justification. RLi, 0<i, is justified to the extent that it 
 makes available the informational content that will allow the 
 generation of RLi+1 by the algorithm specified for the generation of 
 RLi+1. 
 b. Condition on identification. RLi, 0≤i, is identifiable in terms of 
 semantic content – that is, in terms of the information extracted by  the 
 algorithm specified for the generation of RLi+1. 
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The condition on identification is formulated in terms of semantic content. This 
means that the process is irreversible. The inherent loss of information 
(digitalization) that accompanies any step from RLi to RLi+1 is inescapable. It is, in 
fact, the precondition on any form of cognition. The condition on justification, 
on the other hand, just guarantees that the information extracted as the 
semantic content at level Ri is indeed available at level Ri-1. 
The requirements imposed on representational levels by these two conditions 
are quite strong. Relevance Theory (Sperber & Wilson 1986, Carston 2002) takes 
our abilities of pragmatic development to constitute (at least) one 
representational level. Information structure in the sense of Lambrecht (1994) 
may be interpreted as constituting a representational level between that defined 
by Relevance Theory and certain ‘lower-order’ level(s) of grammar in terms of 
which HLF formally organizes informational content, perhaps even encroaching 
on the latter. However, as formulated, these two theories do not completely 
satisfy the condition of justification (6a). Both assume that at least some 
information not provided by ‘lower-order’ representational levels is necessary 
and available for their generation. Such extra-linguistic information must be 
disregarded if a consistent representational view is to carry through. The 
suggestion, in other words, is that we seek to explore as far as possible the idea 
that these ‘pragmatic’ abilities generate identifiable higher-order representations 
on the basis of informational input restricted to other identifiable, but ‘lower-
order’, levels of representation. The following section will look at a sequence of 
generative proposals for the architecture of the language faculty as constituted 
by a number of such ‘lower-order’ representational levels in terms of the two 
conditions in (6). 
5.1. Chomskyan Models of the Language Faculty 
Chomsky’s programme has consistently been pursued on the basis of a number 
of assumptions, some of which were listed in (3). One, held “at least since 
Aristotle”, is that language is “form with a meaning” (Chomsky 1980: 61 – cf. 
(3c)). The second is that the human language faculty is an innate, autonomous 
system, with interfaces towards other systems of mind – cf. (3a). These are 
constant factors behind the various implementations of Chomsky’s theory of 
language. The number, relative organization, and, particularly, the 
informational content of the representational levels proposed for these 
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implementations may be decisive for particular versions of the theory, but they 
are only constant to the extent that they help explain, in different ways, aspects 
of the relationship between form and meaning, the content of (3c), within the 
constraints set by the content of (3a). 
5.1.1. Representational Levels 
The set of linguistic levels inherited from the earliest proposals of 
Transformational-Generative Grammar in the Standard Theory (ST) of Aspects 
(Chomsky 1965: 222-3, note 2) comprised phonetic, phonological, 
morphological, phrase structure and transformational levels, explicitly seen as 
forming a hierarchy. These are referred to as “representational levels” already in 
Chomsky (1955: 105), but the notion of “representation of utterances” behind 
his usage there is fairly obviously of an instrumentalist kind later dismissed. 
What would be more in accord with later concepts of representation is the 
relative organization and informational content of the levels of Deep and 
Surface Structure. Through a process of lexical insertion, the system of base-rules 
generates the level of Deep Structure which carries information needed for 
semantic interpretation. The system of transformational rules maps phrase 
marker onto phrase marker, culminating in a Surface Structure which carries 
information needed for phonetic interpretation (Figure 2). The transformational 
steps changing one phrase-marker into the next would satisfy the conditions (6) 
and thus constitute (intermediate) representational levels. The Lexicon is not, in 
fact, a representational level, but an informational source. In the early models it 
provides phonological form to complex symbols of features through lexical 
rules, in later models (from GB) it provides initiating information in the manner 
of light in Marr’s account of vision. As such it is part of the language faculty, but 
otherwise its status is only intermittently the object of particular concern. In the 
following illustrations I will include the representational levels proposed in a 
box, with the algorithmic procedures required for their generation in italics, 
leaving the Lexicon outside. 
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Figure 2. Representational Levels in ST 
There is a high degree of cleanliness and representational rigour about this 
arrangement. It was criticised in the mid-to-late 1960’s on the grounds that the 
irreversibility of transformational derivation was unacceptable. As the Condition 
of Identification states (cf. 6b), this particular piece of criticism was misguided, 
stemming from lack of discrimination between information and meaning. 
Transformational rules (T-rules) were “meaning-preserving”, thus not supposed 
to add or subtract any information needed for semantic interpretation, which 
was all supposed to be available at Deep Structure. However, certain semantically 
‘empty’ elements, like expletives, might be inserted by T-rule. Similarly, 
structures carrying all the information needed for phonetic and prosodic 
interpretation were generated by T-rules, essentially through linear 
reorganization of elements identified at Deep Structure, controversially implying 
that Deep Structures were, themselves, somehow linearly ordered. The 
arrangement gave rise to ‘transformational families’ of sentences, sentences 
derived from the same lexical input and the same Deep Structure, but taking on 
different Surface Structure forms by undergoing different transformational 
histories. Semantic interpretation was identified with truth-functional content, 
so Deep Structure representations were seen as providing a grammatical level of 
description corresponding fairly closely to the logical notion of ‘propositional 
content’. 
The cleanliness of this picture was disturbed in the Extended Standard Theory 
(EST – Chomsky 1968, 1970, 1972). Questions of ‘lexical’ vs. ‘non-lexical’ 
transformations were prominent at the time, as was the question of identifying 
the proper representational level(s) for the semantic interpretation of a fairly 
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narrowly circumscribed, but varied, body of linguistic facts. Presupposition, 
focus, certain anaphoric phenomena associated with contrastive stress, the 
interpretation of modal and temporal auxiliaries were among areas singled out 
for which a surface structure location of interpretive information seemed to be 
required (Figure 3). 
 
Figure 3. Representational Levels in EST 
The information for semantic interpretation still residing at Deep Structure was, 
in particular, information needed to identify grammatical relations by 
configurational means, and thematic relations associated with selectional 
properties of lexical items introduced there, but also the various presupposed 
pieces of information carried by lexical items like assassinate, dissuade, etc., 
which Generative Semantics had been proposing as constituting legitimate 
phrase-markers to be replaced by lexical items by lexical T-rules, and which the 
lexicalist position taken by Chomsky in EST just regarded as elements of 
meaning with no particular grammatical import and thus just introduced with 
the lexical items themselves. More ‘disruptive’ of the orderliness of ST, however, 
was information needed for quantifier interpretation and prosodic matters of 
focus and anaphora. In order to account for this, a somewhat informal 
representational ‘level’ of “shallow structure” was sometimes mentioned as a late 
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stage in the course of the derivational history of a sentence (e.g. Chomsky 1972). 
At, or through, this level, a set of general conditions on transformations was 
defined, specifically determining what information without explicit Deep Structure 
origin must be located at Surface Structure, for purposes of semantic 
interpretation. 
With the advent of trace-theory in the Revised Extended Standard Theory (REST 
– Chomsky 1976), a device for keeping track of information was at hand which 
allowed all aspects of meaning to be located at the representational level of 
Surface Structure, resolving at the same time problems with the standard notion 
of anaphora in favour of co-indexation of traces with their antecedents. Trace-
theory likewise extended the coverage of interpretation of scope of quantifiers. 
Issues of lexical transformations having been settled by EST, the Lexicon is again 
just a part of the base-rule system (Figure 4): 
 
Figure 4. Representational Levels in REST 
REST saw the introduction of the term ‘logical form’, supposed to identify a level 
of representation carrying information about “bound anaphora, scope, thematic 
relations, etc.” The logical form was “subject to further interpretation by other 
semantic rules (SIR-2) interacting with other cognitive structures giving fuller 
representations of meaning” (Chomsky 1976: 105). Note, in particular, that 
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information for the identification of thematic relations is now located at the 
level of logical form, even though it is still assumed to be introduced as a 
function of selectional properties of lexical items as elements of the “Initial 
Phrase Marker”. Indexed traces provided the necessary link. 
The conceptual shift towards a Principles and Parameters (PP) framework 
initiated by GB (Chomsky 1981), which essentially replaced the concept of rules 
with a set of principles that internal grammars must meet, and which 
reinterpreted Universal Grammar as a reservoir of parameters whose values are 
set by experience in Chomsky (1986), was in part motivated by the 
interpretation of various kinds of operators, quantified NPs and the wh-operator, 
which seemed to require access to information located at a more abstract level 
than that provided by S-structure. Models of the language faculty are now 
presented in terms of a T-model (Figure 5). 
 
Figure 5. T-model of GB etc. 
Chomsky (1981) is the most comprehensive statement of the technical 
framework of Generative Grammar since Aspects (1965), and it is perfectly 
possible to use it as a standard for a descriptively adequate grammar, without 
much concern for its potential adequacy for explaining its relationship with 
biological equipment or mental capacities, as documented by textbooks like 
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Haegeman (1991). There, initially two representational levels are envisaged, D-
Structure and S-Structure. Both carry information about syntactic properties, 
with predicate-argument and thematic relations located at D-Structure, linearity 
determined at S-Structure. Logical Form (LF) is introduced as a late, third 
representational level carrying information needed for truth-functional 
interpretation. This particular organization favours a production rather than a 
reception model of language structure. LF is essentially an isomorphism on S-
Structure, and movement operations at LF leave no overt phonological traces. 
The flow of information between levels is technically implemented as the 
formation of chains, syntactic objects consisting of antecedents and co-indexed 
traces. 
The T-model is the general format which the Minimalist Program (MP) took over 
(Chomsky 1993), except that the levels of D-structure and S-structure are no 
longer identifiable as unified levels of representation. Likewise, ‘Move ’ as the 
sole syntactic process is abandoned, replaced by a sequence of distinct 
operations which in ordered co-operation generate structures at PF and LF from 
an initial selection of elements from the Lexicon, a “numeration” or “lexical 
array”, through a sequence of intermediate derivational steps. These are no 
longer deterministic, but operations that build structure on the basis of an 
indeterministic assignment of “strength” to the various grammatical feature 
bundles that drive them, and thus no longer satisfy the conditions on 




Figure 6. Representational Levels in MP 
Summarizing the main point of this somewhat heavy-handed tour de force 
through various models of the language faculty, the representational level 
needed for the assignment of (truth conditional) meaning to strings of sound 
has gradually shifted from Deep Structure through “Shallow Structure” to S-
Structure to the level of LF, an isomorphism on S-Structure. The motivation for 
these shifts has invariably been claimed to be empirical, and justification for 
them has been sought in extended coverage of data, both in terms of number of 
languages and of language internal types of expression taken into account. In 
this way, they have contributed immensely to the understanding of the 
complexities of language structure, setting new standards for descriptive 
adequacy of proposed grammars. However, while not denying the importance of 
the empirical facts to be explained, I will nevertheless claim that motivation for 
the technical innovations and changes internally defining the various versions, 
has been weak. They have been aimed at consolidating the flow of information 
between levels of representation admitted inside the boxes, hence system 
internally, reduplicating information available at earlier levels. Many of them 
have indeed been jettisoned as “notational artefacts” under requirements 
imposed by shifting theoretical concerns. One of the most radical proposals in 
this respect is the rejection of X-bar theory in favour of “bare phrase structure” 
(Chomsky 1995c), a proposal that reflects the somewhat unstable ontological 
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status of such theoretical constructs as V-bar, vP, etc. More relevantly, it is a 
proposal that favours a derivational over a representational approach, thus 
reflecting Chomsky’s view of the aim of linguistics. 
5.2. The Aim of Linguistics 
The aim of linguistics, on Chomsky’s account, is to describe and explain the 
various levels inside the boxes in Figures 2-6 above, given a lexical input. What 
is supposed to happen from one stage to the next – crucially, in all models, 
involving movement in some form – is regarded as a derivation, that is, a 
reshuffling at level Ln of the information available at level Ln-1. The information 
preserving requirement is codified as the Projection Principle, which informally 
states that all information originating in lexical items is syntactically 
represented, and that it is represented at all levels. The boxes and their contents 
are seen as forming a closed system, variously and progressively described as “a 
device of some sort for producing the sentences of the language under analysis” 
(Chomsky 1957: 11), “the knowledge of the language that provides the basis for 
actual use of language by a speaker-hearer” (Chomsky 1965: 9), “the language 
faculty” (Chomsky 1980: 59), “a highly structured theory of UG” (Chomsky 
1981: 3-4), “the basic elements of I-language” (Chomsky 1986: 51), and a 
“notion of structure” (Chomsky 1995b: 3), to culminate in the following 
formulation that deserves special attention: 
The study of language tries to develop bodies of doctrine 
with an eye to eventual unification. Its constructs and 
principles can properly be “termed mental,” and assumed to 
be “the result of organical structure” – how, it remains to 
discover. On these aspects of the way language engages the 
world, there is little more to say. (Chomsky 2000: 168, 
italics added). 
 
I take these various formulations to circumscribe the language faculty as 
understood in section 5.1. However, in a highly controversial and widely 
discussed article co-authored with Hauser and Fitch, Chomsky has latterly 
introduced a distinction between a “narrow” (FLN) and a “broad” (FLB) 
conception of the language faculty. FLB is assumed to include “a sensory-motor 
system, a conceptual-intentional system, and the computational mechanisms for 
recursion, providing the capacity to generate an infinite range of expressions 
from a finite set of elements”, whereas FLN by hypothesis “only includes 
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recursion and is the only uniquely human component of the language faculty” 
(Hauser, Chomsky, and Fitch 2002: 1569). They explicitly exclude memory from 
FLB together with other organism-internal systems that are necessary, but not 
sufficient, for language (2002: 1570) – cf. the comments on the Lexicon above. 
Not much of the content of the five figures 2-6 is left, even in FLB. I agree with 
Pinker and Jackendoff (2005) in their near-total rejection of recursion as the sole 
and central hallmark of language. Consequently, HLF should be taken as 
summing up the boxed elements of figures 2-6. 
Whether HLF, FLB or FLN is assumed as the content of the language faculty, it 
could be argued that Chomsky has so far failed to give a single, coherent, unified 
and universally accepted account of it. As Gazdar and his colleagues noted 
already in 1985, if Chomsky’s programme is a branch of psychology or biology 
at all, “it is so far the branch with the greatest pretensions and the fewest reliable 
results.” (Gazdar et al. 1986: 5). As would appear from the last Chomsky quote 
above, however, this is just a matter of time – “how, it remains to discover”. 
What’s more, it is not necessarily linguistics that has failed to deliver: 
Any progress towards this [Minimalist – TT] goal will deepen 
a problem for the biological sciences that is already far from 
trivial: how can a system such as human language arise in 
the mind/brain, or for that matter, in the organic world, in 
which one seems not to find anything like the basic 
properties of human language? That problem has sometimes 
been posed as a crisis for the cognitive sciences. The concerns 
are appropriate, but their locus is misplaced; they are 
primarily a problem for biology and the brain sciences, 
which, as currently understood, do not provide any basis for 
what appear to be fairly well established conclusions about 
language. Much of the broader interest of the detailed and 
technical study of language lies right here, in my opinion. 
(Chomsky 1995b: 1-2, italics added) 
 
The faculty of language is a property of the “mind/brain”, Chomsky’s compound 
expression to deflate philosophical dualism. This may be a desirable mode of 
expression for a naturalistic approach, committed to a rejection of a legitimate 
distinction between them; but it has the effect of blurring what might be some 
important edges. Instead of deflating mind-body dualism, it creates a slipway for 
linguistic usage to slide effortlessly between them, at least in one direction: 
“Naturalistic inquiry into the mind yields theories about the brain, its states and 
properties: UG, for example” (Chomsky 2000: 103, italics added). The “crisis” 
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mentioned in the last quotation above is elaborated in the course of the page or 
so of text following it, and it is then suggested that “[v]arious remedies have 
been proposed to deal with this crisis. One is the proposal that “the mental is 
the neurophysiological at a higher level”’, dismissed as being “now a hypothesis 
about the neurophysiological, not a characterization of the mental” (Chomsky 
2000: 104). Inquiry into the brain, in other words, does not yield theories of the 
mind. Yet once again, it may be wondered that other naturalist proposals are not 
considered, in particular Dretske’s dictum that “the mind is the representational 
face of the brain”. This is as explicitly nondualist as one might wish, but it retains 
a certain principled manner in which talk about the system can be distinguished 
from talk about what the system does. 
No doubt legitimate objections can be raised to Chomsky’s claim that providing 
a theory of the human language faculty is the goal of linguistics. These would be 
objections I would not know how to respond to, except by disagreement. 
Another kind of objection might be that the goal is too ambitious, that it 
constitutes a “mystery” rather than a “problem”, in Chomsky’s (1976) terms. 
This would be of a kind with Chomsky’s own objection to the possibility of 
formulating a coherent theory of interpreting, for example, on the grounds that 
it would have to amount to a theory of successful communication and as such 
be “far too complex and obscure to merit attention in empirical enquiry” 
(Chomsky 2000: 70). Complexity should not be a deterrent. On his own 
frequent insistence, language is even highly “complex” – so the argument would 
just have to maintain that the language faculty is “obscure”, not an invalid 
proposition in itself. A third kind of objection is the one inherent in Gazdar’s 
criticism that despite concerted effort, few tangible results have appeared to 
support the claim that linguistics is a subbranch of psychology and biology, a 
view apparently sanctioned by Chomsky himself in the second italicized passage 
from (1995b) above. Since Gazdar and Chomsky wrote, results have appeared, 
though many still remain contentious, for example the evidence from studies on 
the KE-family (Alcock et al. 2002, MacWhinney 2002) and the role of FOXP2 as a 
‘language gene’ (Vargha-Khadem et al. 2005). None of these studies are 
conducted from explicitly Chomskyan points of view, but others are. One such 
is the study by Christensen (2005). Let me therefore briefly summarize some of 
his relevant findings and proposals. 
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6. THE LANGUAGE FACULTY IN BRAIN STUDIES 
Apart from careful and detailed linguistic analysis of negation in a variety of 
genetically and typologically distinct languages, the research reported on in 
Christensen (2005, expanded in Christensen 2008, and summarized in the 
present volume, to which Danish readers are referred) provides a state of the art 
survey on neurolinguistic work related to movement phenomena, in addition to 
reports on two kinds of brain scanning experiments designed and carried out by 
himself. The focus on movement – the constant and crucial ingredient in 
Chomsky’s overall derivational procedure – makes Christensen’s study 
particularly apt as a testing ground for the neurophysiological implementation 
of Chomsky’s theoretical claims. 
One aim of the study is to find experimental evidence to sustain what 
Christensen calls the Domain Hypothesis, a hypothesis that takes CP, IP, and VP 
as three distinct but interrelated representational domains as its point of 
departure. As such it takes up the challenge posed by Marr’s third level of 
explanation to be satisfied by a computational theory, the level of 
implementation. In contrast to the present paper, Christensen’s is loyal to the 
technical aspects of Chomsky’s theory. It is firmly grounded in a version of 
Minimalist theory including derivation by phase, supported by analytical tools 
from Optimality Theory. 
The triggering data for the study is the phenomenon of NEG-shift which to 
varying degrees is an integral part of the narrow syntax of the Germanic 
languages except English, here rudimentarily illustrated from Danish; (7a) has 
undergone NEG-shift, (b) has not. They are strictly synonymous, but (b) is by far 
the preferred version in modern spoken Danish. 
What matters here is the fact that NEG-shift, under given assumptions,5 is 
undoubtedly an overt movement operation in Danish. The question is if it has 
any correlation with increased neuronal activity in any of the core syntactic 
areas of the brain, notably Brocca’s area, by presumption detectable by means of 
various methods of brain scanning. 
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The linguistic data comprises four types, NEG-shifted and non-NEG-shifted 
sentences, wh-questions and yes/no-questions of the same number of words, 
along the rough structural lines of (7): 
(7) 
 
The reason for this particular choice of structures is that the landing site for the 
NEG-shifted object in (a) is a position inside the IP-domain, whereas for the wh-
moved object of (c) it is inside the CP-domain. The occurrence of faktisk 
‘actually’ in (a) is due to the demand for an even number of words. One 
interesting finding, incidentally, was that there was a significant difference in 
response time towards 5-word as against 6-word sentences when it was a matter 
of absence vs. presence of a finite Aux, but not when it was a matter of ingen ‘no’ 
vs. ikke … nogen ‘not … any’ (p. 274). 
Christensen is careful to distinguish between various kinds and levels of 
modularity. He dissolves the “mind/brain” compound, claiming that the 
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language faculty, as a mental phenomenon, is a unitary system, separate from 
“other systems of mind” – vision, proprioception, etc. In contrast, its 
implementation in the brain need not be – in fact, is not. It is a distributed 
syntax network, different parts of which are activated depending on what kind 
of linguistic task is called for. However, this does not entail that we need find 
‘corresponding’ modules at the level of implementation. This is a fairly standard 
generative view. What may not be quite so standard is his commitment to the 
Domain Hypothesis, which states that movement is sensitive to the syntactic 
target domain (CP, IP). 
The empirical basis for the conjecture of the Domain Hypothesis is the 
important, though negative, finding that NEG-shift apparently triggers no increased 
activity in the core syntactic areas. Assuming that movement in general should be 
predicted to trigger such increase, that both wh-movement and NEG-shift are 
(overt) movement operations, and given the experimental result that wh-
movement does trigger increased activity in Brocca’s area, lack of it in connection 
with NEG-shift is in need of independent explanation. Hence the Domain 
Hypothesis. 
Subjects are supposed to originate in the VP-domain (cf. 7) and summarily move 
to the canonical subject position in IP, in both declaratives and interrogatives. If 
no other constituent is moved to CP-Spec, subjects are moved further into CP to 
satisfy the Danish V2 requirement in declaratives, whereas they stay in IP in 
interrogatives (cf. 7a, b vs. c, d). These facts are mentioned (p. 293). However, 
there is no explicit comparison of the two tasks that do not involve object 
movement (7b, d), although this would seem to bear directly on the Domain 
Hypothesis. If the Domain Hypothesis is correct, we would predict activation in 
Brocca’s area in response to declaratives like (7b), where movement of the 
subject (ultimately) targets the CP-domain, but not in response to yes/no-
questions like (7d), where it just targets the IP-domain. Differences of activation 
in these tasks would therefore provide evidence for domain boundaries, if not 
(necessarily) for the Domain Hypothesis itself. 
These consequences are strictly the concern of linguistic theory, not of the 
neurolinguistic theory of mind-brain correlation. But there is one consequence 
which is the concern of neurolinguistic theory that output from operations in 
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the various syntactic domains is required to interface with “other systems of 
mind” during derivation. It is no doubt correct that linguistics and 
neurolinguistics operate with different magnitudes of conceptual fine-
grainedness (‘The Granularity Mismatch Problem’ – p. 247) and with radically 
different basic entities (‘The Ontological Incommensurability Problem’ – p. 248). 
But that does not affect this particular issue, which can be formulated as a 
problem on either side of the linguistics – neurolinguistics divide. It is a question 
of information. 
Both [types of tasks – the distinction between them not 
relevant to the point at issue – TT] involve syntactic 
processing, and I shall argue that interfacing between core 
syntax and other cognitive domains is reflected in bilateral 
activation patterns with focal points determined by type of 
information involved, for example thematic information in 
the right hemisphere. (Christensen 2005: 253, italics added) 
 
He continues: 
At various points during the derivation, the computational 
system interfaces with higher cognitive systems. That is, 
partial syntactic representations are mapped onto 
thematic/semantic, grammatical, and pragmatic 
(information-structural/discourse related) representations 
(unless otherwise stated they are all normally subsumed 
under the label of LF [Logical Form – TT]). (p. 255) 
 
The last parenthesis causes ambiguity. What is the antecedent/referent of “they 
… all” in the last line? It may be either the “partial syntactic representations” or 
the “thematic/semantic, grammatical, and pragmatic (information-
structural/discourse related) representations”. On the former reading, the partial 
syntactic derivations have reached LF-form before transfer. On a conservative 
interpretation, this suggests that they provide information for the generation of 
higher order representations of a thematic/semantic, grammatical, and 
pragmatic nature, which are thus ‘outside’ the domain of LF, and hence – 
presumably – HLF. On the latter reading, higher order representations of a 
thematic/semantic, grammatical and pragmatic nature are already generated at 
LF for the partial syntactic representations to ‘map onto’ – hence part of HLF. 
On either interpretation, however, more information is needed for the 
generation of higher order representations than is provided by the core syntactic 
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processes. Some of it, true, may derive from conceptual/semantic content of 
whatever lexical items were in the numeration, but much of it is not. If Carston 
(2002: 334ff) is right in regarding, for example, processes of broadening and 
narrowing of conceptual content ‘on-line’ as forming part of a representational 
level towards the construction of propositional content, supervening on those 
provided by the core syntactic processes, then the LF interface perhaps becomes 
nothing but a portmanteau with indiscriminate content. 
To conclude, the results of Christensen’s scanning experiments are important, 
but do not provide much support for the theoretical linguistic claims made. In 
particular, the question of domain boundaries, if the Domain Hypothesis is to be 
upheld, is not trivial. Discussion of these various issues may be fruitful for the 
purpose of refining and fine-tuning current theoretical assumptions. The 
problem is that particular choices in these areas seem not to have any empirical 
consequences, nor do they seem to be refutable by E-linguistic evidence or by 
neurolinguistic evidence of implementation. What Christensen’s scanning 
experiments do seem to support, however, are claims against monolithic 
conceptions of the language faculty, and in particular against a too 
comprehensive and indiscriminate conception of the level of logical form. 
7. CONCLUSION 
The preceding sections have argued that the mainstream generativist position on 
the human language faculty is a consequence of its failure to distinguish 
between the system and its functionality, persistent adherence to the basic 
assumptions of (3), the degree and kind of idealizations that underlie the 
programme, and, most importantly, from the investigative consequences drawn from 
these idealizations. Chomsky himself has consistently argued for regarding the 
language faculty as an “organ”, autonomous relative to other systems of the 
“mind/brain”, on a par with the visual system. It may even turn out to be true; 
or, for all we know, it may turn out to be true in any combination of ways 
between AUTOSYN, AUTOGRAM, and AUTOKNOW6 that Newmeyer (1998) discusses in 
detail. But this would be a claim about the system. Adoption of any autonomy 
thesis legitimizes a strategy of investigation that targets what amounts to the 
systemic properties of HLF. This is not a question of how “language engages the 
world”; nor is it a question of “methodological dualism”. It is a question of how 
language engages other internal faculties, even though it might be autonomous in 
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any way we like. It is a matter of flow of information, not within the system, but 
towards ‘other systems of mind’. 
By insisting on this strategy sanctioned by the autonomy thesis, one may 
legitimately dismiss any question of ‘external’ – yet mind-internal – 
functionality that might arise. Any question of what the language faculty does 
whenever it does what it is supposed to do, is answered in system-internal terms. 
The language faculty generates representations. This is not in doubt. But the 
information that these representations are presumed to carry is information about the 
system that generates them. This is a major point at which Dretske’s and 
Chomsky’s views diverge. For a system to be a representational system it must 
carry information about something distinct from itself – or so Dretske and Marr 
tell us. Marr’s theoretical account may avail itself of “blobs” and “edges”, and 
may specify the mathematical workings of the system as computing a 
convolution with a Gauss-function – but in the end it aims to explain why what 
we see is a box and not a tree. This is the point of Egan’s insistence on the 
legitimacy of distinguishing between the mathematical and the cognitive 
functions computed, discussed above (section 3.5). It is, in fact, the Principle of 
Functional Displacement. 
What Chomsky currently tells us about the faculty of language understood as a 
system may indeed be true – at present there is no way of knowing. Suppose it is. 
It then constitutes a body of facts about a system – what its elements are, how 
they are organized, how they function relatively to each other. But they are not 
representational facts, hence not mental facts. They are facts about a 
representational system, hence ‘brain’ facts, even though ‘brain’ here is not a 
matter of neurons and synapses, but rather of a closed system of theoretical 
constructs.  It may or may not be the case that the ‘real’ brain sciences are 
lagging behind with respect to tangible results to support the findings of 
linguistics, as Chomsky suggests. Nevertheless, it would be welcome for the 
predictions made by linguistics to have some kind of neuronal effect that could 
at least be sustained by results from fMRI-scannings and the like. As shown 
above, at least some of them do not. The current generative description of the 
language faculty corresponds to the description of a camera in terms of f-stops, 
shutter speeds, ASA-numbers, and focal length that Dretske (1995) dismisses as 
relevant to a deeper understanding of cameras (4.3).  
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By way of conclusion, an extension of this analogy in a somewhat radical 
manner may be used to formulate three positions, thereby sharpening the 
relative positions of Chomsky and Dretske vis à vis a rough ‘functional linguistic’ 
one. Chomsky insists that the only relevant and interesting thing to be gained 
from scrutiny of a camera’s outputs – the pictures it takes – is the support it gives 
or fails to give to predictions about the technical properties of the camera and how 
they exchange information. It is possible to be sceptical about the falsifiability of 
statements flowing from this procedure. Dretske insists that the interesting 
question is what a camera must be able to do for there to be pictures (of whatever) 
in the first place. Focus on this kind of functionality will constrain the technical 
space within which it can be implemented, but is mute on specific issues of 
implementation, which may vary from one camera to the next. 
The ‘functional linguistic’ interest in cameras on this analogy is incidental, at 
best that they meet required, but technically unspecified, standards of quality of 
implementation to a degree that makes it possible to determine from the 
pictures they take, who or what is depicted. That’s what matters. This is no 
doubt a desirable practical interest – what would be the point of taking pictures 
if you can’t see what they are pictures of; but it is not an interest that helps us 
understand cameras, or how they work. And if that is what we want to be able to 
do, my money is on Dretske, rather than on Chomsky. 
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NOTES 
1 This section draws freely and selectively on a number of Dretske’s works, particularly 
1988, Chapter 3, and 1995, Chapter 1, which together provide the most 
comprehensive general coverage of representational systems I have come across. There 
are, to be sure, many descriptions of concrete implementations of dedicated 
representational systems in the Artificial Intelligence and Cognitive Science literatures, 
as well as alternative general descriptions, like Millikan (1984). However, they all 
conform to the general requirements on such systems (except perhaps the notion of 
misrepresentation) that Dretske proposes, so I focus on Dretske’s descriptions and 
taxonomies, in particular those aspects of them that have a direct bearing on the main 
issue here – the representational function of HLF. 
2 Chomsky sometimes says, e.g. 2000: 161, that David Marr is often incorrectly attributed 
views that might be construed as ‘externalist’. It could be because of passages like this. 
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3 The external receptacles of sensory information – eyes, nose, mouth/tongue, ears at 
least – also carry information about themselves. But having blue, or pretty, eyes is not 
a necessary condition on seeing well. 
4 I suppose it could be argued that ‘derivation by phase’ is an attempt to make syntactic 
theory more (purely) derivational. 
5 Central among these is that the added neuronal activity empirically recorded in 
connection with the processing of wh-structures is due to movement, and not, for 
example, caused by the need to maintain the wh-element in working memory for 
resolution of ‘filler – gap’ dependencies; cf. e.g. Hawkins (2004: 169ff) for a survey of 
psycholinguistic explanations. 
6 The three terms concern, respectively, the autonomy of syntax relative to other 
linguistic ‘modules’ (AUTOSYN), the autonomy of HLF relative to other cognitive 
faculties (AUTOGRAM), and whether our knowledge of the language system 
(‘competence’) is independent of our knowledge of how to use it (‘performance’) 
(AUTOKNOW). 
